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Vietnam has recently emerged as a key player 
in Southeast Asia. Strategically located at the 
heart of the Asia–Pacific region, Vietnam is 
home to a population of 88 million people 
and a promising economy that has registered 
an average annual growth rate of around 
7% over the past decade. Since adopting 
the ‘Doi Moi’ (‘renovation’) policy in the 
late 1980s, Vietnam has also been pursuing 
an active and constructive foreign policy 
aimed at diversifying and multilateralising 
its external relations. Vietnam’s quest for 
deeper international economic integration 
and a greater political role has therefore 
brought the international community an 
opportunity to engage the once‑pariah state 
in building a peaceful, stable and prosperous 
regional order.
Meanwhile, China has been emerging as a 
global superpower. Although its impressive 
economic development has been praised as 
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providing the region with a growth engine, 
China’s substantial military build‑up and its 
growing assertiveness in the South China Sea 
(Biên Dông or East Sea in Vietnamese) have 
unnerved countries across the region. In 
response, the US has recently decided to 
‘pivot’ its strategic focus to the Asia–Pacific 
and make efforts to strengthen its relations 
with key players in the region. In this 
connection, due to its strategic location as 
well as its particular historical relations with 
China, Vietnam may play a significant role in 
future regional security architectures, which 
are likely to be shaped by how regional 
powers perceive and respond to the rise of the 
Middle Kingdom. Against this backdrop, the 
study of Vietnam’s strategic thinking and 
policymaking, especially vis‑a‑vis major 
powers, provides valuable clues about how 
best to engage Vietnam in the management 
of regional peace and security.
This paper analyses Vietnam’s strategic 
trajectory over the past two decades, with an 
emphasis on its relations with China and the 
US, its policies on the South China Sea dispute, 
and the implications for regional players. The 
paper provides an overview of the rationales 
and mechanisms of Vietnam’s strategic 
policymaking. It then goes on to examine 
Vietnam’s relationships with China and the 
US, and examine the country’s position 
on the South China Sea dispute, in general 
as well as in relation to growing Chinese 
assertiveness. Finally the paper discusses the 
implications of Vietnam’s strategic policy for 
the international community in general and 
Australia in particular.
Vietnam’s strategic policymaking: 
rationales and mechanisms
Following the reunification of Vietnam in 
1975, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
enthusiastically embarked on a new project: 
transforming the country along the socialist 
path. However, as Gabriel Kolko puts it, 
Vietnam won a war but lost the peace.1
Economic failures after 1975 soon caused 
the people’s living standard to deteriorate 
dramatically. The situation got even worse 
after Vietnam failed to secure diplomatic 
normalisation with the US and was forced 
to engage in two costly wars, one against 
China in 1979 and the other against the Khmer 
Rouge from 1979 to 1989. Maintaining war 
efforts put excessive strains on the already 
war‑torn economy, and a socioeconomic 
crisis in the mid‑1980s caused the perceived 
legitimacy of the VCP to fall precipitously.
Against that backdrop, the VCP decided to 
adopt the Doi Moi policy at its sixth national 
congress in late 1986, with a view to building 
a socialist‑oriented market economy. Under 
Doi Moi, the VCP has introduced a series 
of new policies, which includes developing 
a multisector market‑based economy, 
renovating the economic structure, stabilising 
the socioeconomic environment, promoting 
science and technology, and opening up the 
country’s foreign relations.
To promote economic reform, the 
party had to retune its foreign policy 
to allow for the country’s integration 
into the global economy.
The adoption of the Doi Moi policy can 
be seen as an effort by the VCP to restore 
its falling legitimacy through economic 
performance. To promote economic reform, 
the party had to retune its foreign policy 
to allow for the country’s integration into 
the global economy. In fact, Doi Moi has 
been the single most important driver of 
changes in Vietnam’s foreign policy since 
the late 1980s.2 Under the policy, Vietnam 
sought to ‘diversify’ and ‘multilateralise’ 
its foreign relations, especially with major 
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powers and international institutions. The 
VCP’s aims were obvious: to create a peaceful 
external environment and facilitate the use 
of foreign resources, such as capital, markets 
and technology, for Vietnam’s domestic 
economic reform. To those ends, the seventh 
national congress of the VCP in June 1991 
stated that ‘Vietnam wishes to befriend all 
countries in the world community.’ Vietnam 
officially normalised its relations with China 
in November 1991 and with the US in July 
1995. So far, it has established diplomatic 
relations with 172 countries and secured 
membership in most major international and 
regional institutions.
Doi Moi has also served as an essential basis 
for Vietnam’s strategic vision. The top priority 
of the country’s strategic policy is no longer 
restricted to ensuring national security; it’s 
now extended to embrace economic 
development and international prestige as 
equally important objectives.
Those changes in Vietnam’s foreign policy 
and strategic outlook have helped mobilise 
valuable external resources to turn the 
country into an economic ‘rising star’. Its GDP 
(at official exchange rates) has increased 
sevenfold since 1985 to US$103 billion in 20103, 
bringing Vietnam into the ranks of low 
middle income countries. The relatively robust 
economic development over the past two 
decades has helped to reduce the poverty rate 
from around 60% in the late 1980s to 10.6% 
in 2011. Those socioeconomic achievements 
are undoubtedly the most important basis 
for the VCP’s claim to legitimacy for its rule, 
Labourers work at a garment factory south of Hanoi 4 January 2012. Vietnam's export of textiles and garments last year jumped 25% from 2010 to 
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especially when the party’s traditional sources 
of legitimacy—such as nationalism and 
socialist ideals—have paled in importance.
Because policymakers have to take 
into consideration the dual concerns 
of national interests and regime 
security, they end up with fewer 
policy options...
Because Doi Moi has been advanced as a 
tool to promote both national wellbeing and 
regime security, Vietnam’s strategic policy 
under the leadership of the VCP has been 
subject to conflicting interests, especially 
where a policy may be favourable for national 
wellbeing but harmful for regime security, or 
vice versa. For example, deeper international 
economic integration and further market 
liberalisation are likely to bring Vietnam 
greater prosperity, but they have also alarmed 
a number of VCP conservatives who see them 
as threats that might cause the country to 
deviate from the socialist path or undermine 
the party’s rule. Meanwhile, although the 
VCP’s emphasis on the central role of state‑run 
businesses is criticised by many economists 
as detrimental to the overall efficiency of 
the economy, the policy is maintained as a 
measure to protect the economic foundation 
of the country’s transition to socialism. 
Such conflicts of interests present a serious 
problem within the policymaking apparatus 
of Vietnam. Because policymakers have to 
take into consideration the dual concerns of 
national interests and regime security, they 
end up with fewer policy options—and worse 
outcomes—than if national interests were the 
only determinant in decision‑making.
The same conflict between national interests 
and regime security also applies to Vietnam’s 
foreign policymaking. For example, closer 
relations with the US and Western countries 
are likely to bring tangible economic and 
strategic benefits to Vietnam. It may get 
better access to Western capital, markets and 
technologies while enjoying a better position 
to balance against the growing power of China. 
However, concerns have been raised among 
a segment of party officials that Vietnam 
should beware the ‘peaceful evolution’ scheme 
allegedly plotted by the US and Western 
countries to subvert the VCP regime. ‘Peaceful 
evolution’ has been officially considered as one 
of the four major threats to Vietnam, which 
also include lagging behind other countries 
economically, deviation from socialism, and 
corruption. The fear is further intensified 
among party ideologists when the US and 
some Western countries keep insisting that 
Vietnam must improve its human rights record 
as a condition for stronger bilateral relations.
On the economic front, despite widespread 
criticism of Vietnam’s bias towards 
state‑run businesses as a hindrance to the 
country’s economic performance, especially 
in the wake of the de facto bankruptcy 
of the giant state‑owned shipbuilding 
corporation Vinashin, recent negotiations 
on the Trans‑Pacific Economic Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) have demonstrated 
Vietnam’s unwavering resistance to US 
calls for reforms of Vietnam’s state‑run 
businesses.4 These examples show that in 
promoting Vietnam’s foreign relations the 
VCP remains reluctant to embrace options 
that might compromise the regime’s security.
When a conflict of interests arises, policy is 
negotiated internally between what some 
researchers consider as the two competing 
camps within the Party: conservatives and 
reformists.5 Because most of the important 
decisions are made by the Politburo and the 
VCP Central Committee under the principle of 
collective leadership, it’s difficult for the public 
to identify and measure the relative weights 
of conservatives or reformists in the outcome 
of any particular policy.
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Still, the labels ‘conservative’ and ‘reformist’ 
may be useful to describe certain segments 
of high‑ranking party officials who favour 
specific policies. Conservatives tend to put 
regime security first, and so take a cautious 
approach to economic liberalisation and favour 
stronger ties with China rather than with 
Western countries. Reformists seek further 
economic liberalisation and stronger relations 
with Western countries—although ideally at 
minimum risk to regime security.
The competition between the two camps for 
the VCP’s policy helm has been happening 
in all fields, and, although regime security 
may enjoy a higher priority in most cases, the 
conservatives are unable to dictate policy in 
all fields. On the economic front, for example, 
although there are still reservations about 
further liberalisation, so far the reformists 
seem to be in the lead, especially when the 
VCP is feeling the pressure for further reform 
in order to maintain the country’s positive 
economic performance—the vital basis of 
the party’s legitimacy. Conservatives seem 
to be more influential when it comes to 
ideological and internal security matters, and 
are apparently determined to control possible 
damage to the regime’s security from further 
economic liberalisation.
Vietnam’s strategic policy towards 
China and the US
One of the most important achievements 
of Vietnam’s diplomacy in the 1990s was 
the normalisation of diplomatic relations 
with China and the US in 1991 and 1995, 
respectively. Normalisation with China 
removed the most significant barrier 
preventing Vietnam from breaking out of 
its international diplomatic isolation and 
allowed the improvement of its ties with 
ASEAN and the US. Subsequently, the overdue 
normalisation of Vietnam’s relations with 
the US enabled the country to enjoy normal 
relations with all major world powers for the 
first time since the socialist republic came into 
being in 1945.
Normalisation also helped expedite Vietnam’s 
international integration and socialisation, 
paving the way for the country’s entry into 
an array of major international political and 
economic arrangements, such as APEC, 
the Asia–Europe Meeting, the World Trade 
Organization, the East Asia Summit, and most 
recently the TPP negotiations. Nevertheless, 
Vietnam has found itself facing a renewed 
challenge: walking the line between China 
and US to best meet both the country’s 
national interests and the VCP’s concerns 
about regime security.
The challenge of balancing great 
powers is not new to Vietnam. 
The challenge of balancing great powers is 
not new to Vietnam. During the Cold War, 
after the split between China and the Soviet 
Union, Vietnam had a hard time balancing its 
relations with the two antagonistic powers. 
Its failure to do so adequately contributed 
to the downward spiral of Sino‑Vietnamese 
relations in the 1970s. Tensions reached 
a climax when China invaded Vietnam in 
early 1979. Although China initially claimed 
that it had decided to ‘teach Vietnam a 
lesson’ because of Vietnam’s earlier military 
intervention into Cambodia, some analysts 
argue that Vietnam’s entry into an alliance 
with the Soviet Union in 1978 was the 
main reason behind China’s decision to 
‘punish’ Vietnam.6
The 1979 war was brief but extremely 
costly for Vietnam, and not only in terms of 
casualties. Then US National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly remarked 
after his meeting with Deng Xiaoping in early 
1979 that ‘China said they will teach Vietnam 
a lesson. I say it will be an entire curriculum.7 
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It was a prediction that ended up coming true. 
Aside from maintaining incessant shelling 
and other armed harassment as part of a 
‘phoney war’ along the Sino‑Vietnamese 
border in the 1980s8, China also pursued a 
policy of isolating Vietnam diplomatically and 
providing aid for the Khmer Rouge’s efforts 
to ‘bleed Vietnam white’. Vietnam’s attempts 
to break out of its diplomatic isolation and 
pursue domestic development during the 
1980s were also largely unsuccessful due to 
Chinese obstruction.
Bitter memories of the 1980s are still alive, 
and Vietnam definitely doesn’t want history 
to repeat itself. Therefore, it considers a 
peaceful and stable relationship with China 
one of its top foreign policy priorities. 
Apart from the goal of maintaining a 
peaceful regional environment for internal 
development, there are also other important 
reasons for Vietnamese policymakers to value 
the relationship with China.
First, China remains a close ideological ally of 
Vietnam. Back in the early 1990s, ideological 
affinity was a major driving force behind the 
normalisation of bilateral relations9, especially 
when communist regimes in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe began to collapse, 
causing a fear of the ‘domino effect’ among 
Chinese and Vietnamese leaders. At present, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
the VCP are the only two major communist 
parties in the world that are still in power, and 
they believe that a degree of mutual support 
helps to maintain their rule. The two parties 
have taken specific measures to that end. 
For example, they’ve been holding annual 
conferences to discuss ideological matters 
and exchange experiences in such vital 
issues as party building, mass mobilisation 
and warding off ‘peaceful evolution’. The 
VCP finds the continued rule of the CCP not 
only an important external source of its own 
legitimacy but also a buttress for its regime 
security. Should the CCP fall, the VCP would 
face enormous challenges in maintaining its 
power in Vietnam.
Economic interdependence between the two 
countries is also growing. China has been 
Vietnam’s biggest trading partner since 2004. 
Bilateral trade turnover reached US$27 billion 
and accounted for 17% of Vietnam’s total 
trade in 2010. Most notably, China has 
emerged as Vietnam’s largest source of 
imports, shipping almost a quarter of them 
in 2010. Vietnam is also heavily dependent on 
China for input materials for some of its major 
export industries, such as footwear, garments, 
textiles and furniture.10 Therefore, despite 
problems that have caused tension between 
the two countries, especially Vietnam’s 
perennial trade deficit with China, Vietnam 
generally considers bilateral economic 
relations to be mutually beneficial and 
conducive to peace and cooperation between 
the two countries.
... renewed tensions between Vietnam 
and China currently threaten to roll 
back progress in bilateral relations 
over the past two decades.
Nevertheless, renewed tensions between 
Vietnam and China currently threaten to roll 
back progress in bilateral relations over the 
past two decades. The tensions result from 
various factors. First, China’s unprecedented 
rise and its substantial military build‑up 
have conjured up Vietnam’s historical fear of 
Chinese expansionism. Due to geographical 
proximity and power asymmetry, a far more 
powerful China has been the most serious 
source of threat for Vietnam throughout its 
history. Vietnam’s current perception of the 
China threat is further accentuated by the 
territorial dispute between the two countries 
in the South China Sea. While unable to afford 
a hostile relationship with Beijing, neither 
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will Vietnam sacrifice national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity in exchange for a 
‘good’ relationship on Beijing’s terms. As a 
result, Vietnam has been reaching out to 
foreign powers in an attempt to at least 
deter Chinese aggression in the South China 
Sea, if not to balance against its broader 
regional dominance.
Against this backdrop, the US is undoubtedly 
one of Vietnam’s preferred foreign partners. 
After the two former foes normalised their 
relations in 1995, bilateral relations progressed 
quickly, to such a degree that there have 
been calls from both sides to establish a 
strategic partnership. Economic ties, in 
particular, have been deepened to provide 
a solid foundation for bilateral cooperation. 
After a bilateral trade agreement came into 
effect in late 2001, two‑way trade increased 
more than twelve times within just 10 years 
to reach US$21.8 billion. The US is currently 
Vietnam’s biggest export market, accounting 
for about a fifth of Vietnam’s annual exports 
by value. US investment into Vietnam has also 
increased significantly in recent years, turning 
the US into Vietnam’s seventh largest foreign 
investor in 2010. Vietnam’s decision to enter 
the TPP negotiations is also an indication of 
the growing maturity of the US–Vietnam 
relationship and testifies to Vietnam’s 
willingness to further promote ties with its 
former enemy, not only for economic benefits 
but also for strategic reasons.
China’s rise and its growing 
assertiveness in the South China Sea 
dispute are undoubtedly major factors 
behind Vietnam’s attempts to forge a 
closer relationship with the US...
Along with growing economic ties, 
developments in political relations between 
the two nations have also surprised many 
observers. Over the past decade, they’ve 
exchanged many high‑ranking visits. President 
George W Bush visited Vietnam in 2006, 
while Washington received President Nguyen 
Minh Triet in 2007 and Prime Ministers Phan 
Van Khai and Nguyen Tan Dung in 2005 
and 2008, respectively. Military ties, although 
remaining modest, have also strengthened. 
China’s rise and its growing assertiveness in 
the South China Sea dispute are undoubtedly 
major factors behind Vietnam’s attempts to 
forge a closer relationship with the US—a task 
that seems to have been facilitated by the 
US strategic ‘pivot’ to the Asia–Pacific region. 
Recently, State Secretary Hillary Clinton 
even stated that the US wishes to work with 
Vietnam to promote bilateral relations to the 
level of a ‘strategic partnership’.11
The rapprochement between the two 
former enemies is impressive, but there are 
obstacles that they still have to overcome to 
move their relationship forward. The most 
visible and challenging hurdle is perhaps the 
differences in the two countries’ political 
systems and their perceptions of certain 
values, especially democracy and human 
rights. While a segment of VCP officials still 
harbours suspicions about US intentions 
in improving relations with Vietnam and 
consider the US as the principal perpetrator 
of a ‘peaceful evolution’ scheme against the 
VCP regime, the US also considers Vietnam to 
be a country of poor human rights conditions. 
Some US politicians have indicated that 
further development of bilateral relations will 
be conditional on improvements in Vietnam’s 
human rights record.
The US position on the issue results 
not only from its traditional policy of 
promoting democracy and human rights 
worldwide, but also from the pressure of the 
Vietnamese‑American lobby. Many among 
the 1.7 million Americans of Vietnamese 
origin fled Vietnam after 1975 and maintain 
a hostile attitude to the VCP regime. They 
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have conducted campaigns pressuring the 
US Government to restrict relations with 
Vietnam as a measure to force Vietnam into 
political liberalisation and democratisation. 
Under that pressure, the US has taken a 
number of actions, including an annual review 
of the human rights situation in Vietnam and 
interventions with Vietnamese authorities to 
get a number of political dissidents released 
from detention. In addition, the US used 
to list Vietnam as a ‘country of particular 
concern’ over religious freedom. A bill that 
seeks to link US aid with Vietnam’s human 
rights record has been passed by the House 
of Representative several times but has never 
got through the Senate.
Nevertheless, with the rise of China and the 
recent US decision to shift its strategic focus 
to the Asia–Pacific region, the issue of human 
rights is likely to become less significant as a 
hurdle to further improvements in long‑term 
bilateral relations. History shows that for 
strategic reasons the US has been willing 
to foster close relationships with certain 
countries despite their domestic politics, 
including human rights conditions. The US 
used to be an ally of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
and Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, and managed 
a strategic rapprochement with China 
to counter the Soviet threat in the 1970s. 
Therefore, if the US decides that China’s 
rise is a threat to its interests and should be 
contained, it will probably ignore Vietnam’s 
domestic politics in pursuit of a closer 
strategic relationship.
In such circumstances, there’s yet another 
question that matters: how far would 
Vietnam be willing to venture in the 
relationship? The most likely answer is ‘not 
very far’. After all, a stronger US–Vietnam 
relationship would most likely put unwanted 
strain on Vietnam’s relations with China, 
especially if Sino‑US relations worsened due to 
strategic competition, and it’s not in Vietnam’s 
interest to go through the painful experiences 
of the 1970s and 1980s once again. Although 
things have changed over the past three 
decades and Vietnam is now in a much better 
position to resist pressure from China should 
bilateral relations get worse, its geographical 
proximity and the enduring power asymmetry 
between Vietnam and China would still 
cause Vietnam to think twice before making 
any move that might destabilise its relations 
with its giant northern neighbour. Moreover, 
as a small country, Vietnam doesn’t want to 
be entangled in another great‑power game, 
especially since Sino‑US relations might 
deteriorate over the longer term due to 
strategic competition.12 Conventional wisdom 
has it that the antagonists will seek a way out 
through compromises when conflicts become 
deadlocked. In such situations, the great 
powers could well bargain on the backs of 
their small allies. The 1954 Geneva Conference 
and the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué are two 
cases in point, in which Vietnam was betrayed 
by its own great‑power allies.
... Vietnam’s best policy is to maintain 
a balance between China and the US.
Therefore, Vietnam’s best policy is to maintain 
a balance between China and the US. With 
such a strategic principle in mind, while 
Vietnam continues promoting its relationship 
with the US as a measure to deter China’s 
aggressive behaviours, it would refrain 
from pushing the relationship too far at the 
expense of China. The only scenario in which 
Vietnam might possibly cross the limit and 
temporarily tilt towards the US is when China 
takes aggressive actions against Vietnam, 
such as invading Vietnamese‑held islands 
and features in the Spratlys. For the time 
being, Vietnam will continue to pursue a 
policy of walking the line between China and 
the US. It will consider its relationship with 
the two great powers as part of its overall 
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strategy of ‘diversifying and multilateralising’ 
its foreign relations for the sake of 
domestic development.
The South China Sea dispute in 
Vietnam’s strategic policy
The South China Sea dispute is currently the 
biggest security challenge for Vietnam and a 
major defining factor of Vietnam’s strategic 
policy. It’s hard to overstate the strategic 
importance of the South China Sea, as well as 
the Paracel and Spratly islands, to Vietnam’s 
national security. Stretching along a narrow 
territory with a coastline of 3260 kilometres, 
Vietnam is highly vulnerable to seaborne 
attacks, and the threat would be far more 
serious for Vietnam if it lost control of the 
two archipelagos.
Moreover, the South China Sea plays 
an essential role in Vietnam’s economic 
development. For example, the revenue 
of its national oil and gas corporation, 
PetroVietnam, accounted for 24% 
of Vietnam’s GDP in 2010.13 Most of 
PetroVietnam’s revenue was generated 
from its operation in the South China Sea. 
The maritime economic benefits are, of 
course, not restricted to oil and gas. There are 
also, among other things, fishery, tourism, 
maritime transportation and port services 
in the equation. To promote the marine 
economy, the VCP Central Committee passed 
a resolution in January 2007 on ‘Vietnam’s 
Maritime Strategy Toward the Year 2020’.
According to an implementation roadmap 
issued by the government soon afterwards, 
Vietnam expects that by 2020 the marine 
economy could account for 53%–55% of GDP 
and 55%–60% of exports.14
However, Vietnam’s national security as 
well as its ambition to develop its marine 
economy may face serious setbacks if the 
South China Sea dispute persists. With China’s 
economic rise and military build‑up over the 
past three decades, Vietnam not only stands 
a thinner chance of recovering the Paracel 
Islands, which it lost to China in 1974, but 
also finds its positions in the Spratly Islands 
more vulnerable to a Chinese invasion than 
ever before.15
China has long obstructed Vietnam’s 
economic activities in the South China Sea. 
Apart from seizing hundreds of Vietnamese 
fishing boats every year, China has also 
pressured Western oil and gas corporations to 
cancel their operations in Vietnam’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ).16 In an infamous event 
in May 2011, a Chinese marine surveillance 
vessel even harassed and then deliberately 
cut the cables of a PetroVietnam surveying 
ship deep within Vietnam’s EEZ. The incident 
fuelled a wave of international criticism of 
China’s growing assertiveness in the South 
China Sea and in favour of Vietnam, and 
further alarmed Vietnamese policymakers.
Vietnam’s official position is that the 
South China Sea dispute should be 
solved peacefully through negotiation 
between the parties in accordance 
with international law...
Vietnam’s official position is that the South 
China Sea dispute should be solved peacefully 
through negotiation between the parties in 
accordance with international law, especially 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. Despite China’s lack of interest 
in external legal arbitration, Vietnam has 
been collecting evidence and consolidating 
its legal dossiers on the two archipelagos 
to prepare for the possibility of the dispute 
being settled in an international tribunal. 
Vietnam has also been proactive in using all 
suitable international institutions, especially 
ASEAN, to gather international support and 
soft‑balance against the overwhelming power 
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of China in the South China Sea. A case in 
point is the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea, which 
originated from a joint proposal by Vietnam 
and the Philippines.
Given the wide power gap between 
Vietnam and China and China’s growing 
aggressiveness in asserting its claims, 
Vietnam has also been resorting to other 
measures to at least deter Chinese aggression 
in the area. First, it’s been speeding up its 
military modernisation, with a focus on the 
navy. Since the mid‑1990s, Vietnam has been 
upgrading its naval capabilities through the 
acquisition of modern Svetlyak class fast 
attack craft, Gephard class frigates, six Kilo 
class submarines (to be delivered from 2014), 
Bastion land‑based anti‑ship cruise missiles, 
and extended range artillery munitions. 
Vietnam’s naval modernisation has been 
buttressed by not only arms imports but also 
the development of its own defence industry 
through co‑production and technology 
transfers. It’s reportedly been building Sigma 
class corvettes (in cooperation with the 
Netherlands) and patrol boats modelled on 
the Svetlyak offshore patrol vessel.17
However, Vietnam’s investment in its naval 
capabilities is still very modest compared with 
that of China, its main rival in the South China 
Sea. In 2011, while China’s official military 
budget was $91.5 billion, Vietnam was 
reported to allocate only $2.6 billion to 
defence (about 2.5% of its GDP). Therefore, 
Vietnamese border guards watch the US Seventh Fleet's USS Blue Ridge entering Tien Sa port as Vietnam welcomes the port call of three US naval ships in 
Danang on 23 April 2012. © AFP/HOANG DINH Nam via AAP.
Strategic Insights 11
although Vietnamese leaders have officially 
stated that Vietnam will be self‑reliant and 
never seek to enlist foreign assistance in 
solving its disputes with other countries, it’s 
actually made efforts to reach out to foreign 
powers, both directly and indirectly, to 
compensate for its considerable weakness 
vis‑a‑vis China.
Vietnam’s ‘defence diplomacy’ has been 
stepped up in recent years as a measure to 
promote military cooperation with partners 
of interest. It now maintains bilateral defence 
relations with 65 countries, and it’s also an 
active participant in major regional security 
and defence forums, including the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum and the Shangri‑La Dialogue.
Among various international partners, 
Vietnam seems to place much emphasis on 
its nascent but promising military ties with 
the US. At this stage, Vietnam mainly aims 
to build trust and mutual respect with the 
former foe, but in the long term it wants 
more than that from the relationship. It’s even 
indicated its desire to acquire US weapons 
and military equipment, although its human 
rights record is still seen as a sticking point 
in Washington.18 US naval cooperation with 
Vietnam remains modest, and is generally 
restricted to port calls by US warships. 
However, Vietnam’s strategic decision to turn 
its Cam Ranh port into a service centre open 
to ships of all flags will provide an opportunity 
for the two navies to promote cooperation, as 
well as a legitimate excuse for US naval ships 
to be present in Vietnamese waters. In a less 
direct measure to engage the US in the South 
China Sea dispute, Vietnam has unofficially 
welcomed the US presence in the region as 
a key to regional stability and possibly as a 
check upon the rise of China.19
Vietnam also seeks US moral and diplomatic 
support in the dispute. While China was 
surprised and angered, Vietnam considered 
it a diplomatic victory for the country when 
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated at 
the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum, held in Hanoi, 
that the US had a national interest in freedom 
of navigation, the maintenance of peace and 
stability and respect for international law in 
the South China Sea.
Because a stronger relationship with 
the US may put unwanted strains 
on its relations with China, Vietnam 
has at the same time sought to 
strengthen its relations with regional 
middle powers...
Because a stronger relationship with the US 
may put unwanted strains on its relations 
with China, Vietnam has at the same time 
sought to strengthen its relations with 
regional middle powers, such as Japan, India, 
South Korea and Australia. Beijing tends to 
be less sensitive to changes in Vietnam’s 
relationships with middle powers than it is 
about relations with the US.
Vietnam can also gain significant benefits 
from developing such relations. For example, 
Australia, India and Japan have all voiced their 
support for freedom of navigation and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes in the South 
China Sea, thereby indirectly repudiating 
China’s sweeping claims. And while the US 
may be unwilling to approve arms sales to 
Vietnam, Hanoi is said to be approaching 
India for Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles. 
Australia has also been providing training 
programs for Vietnamese military staff. 
Under the policy of promoting relations with 
regional middle powers, Vietnam has entered 
into ‘strategic partnerships’ with Japan, 
South Korea, and India, while its relationship 
with Australia has been upgraded to a 
‘comprehensive partnership’ since 2009.
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However, although Vietnam is keen to take 
advantage of ASEAN as a group to advance 
its interests, especially vis‑a‑vis China, and 
seems to emphasise the ‘middle power 
approach’ in its current foreign policy, it 
tends to neglect those middle powers within 
ASEAN. For example, while Vietnam has 
established ‘strategic’ or ‘comprehensive’ 
partnerships with nine countries,20 not one of 
those nations is in ASEAN. Vietnam’s relations 
with Indonesia, the most suitable partner 
it could apply this approach to, are quite 
underdeveloped.21 This could be explained 
by the fact that because ASEAN places much 
emphasis on the group’s consensus and 
solidarity, any attempt by Vietnam to forge a 
‘special bilateral relationship’ with any of the 
ASEAN member states, especially the strong 
ones, might result in distrust among the 
group’s members. Perhaps the only exception 
is Vietnam’s ‘special relationship’ with Laos, 
which has been shaped for the most part by 
geographical and historical conditions.
Implications for the international 
community and Australia
Over the past 25 years, Vietnam has 
undergone tremendous changes. In the 1980s, 
it was still perceived as a security threat to 
the region, while its economic failures and 
stagnant domestic situation posed a major 
threat to the internal stability of the country 
itself. Fast forward two decades, and Vietnam 
is now relatively open, has a rapidly growing 
economy and is a constructive player in 
world politics. Successful economic reform 
along with a more open foreign policy under 
Doi Moi has undoubtedly been the most 
important driver of change in Vietnam so far. 
Economic success not only earns Vietnam 
respect worldwide but also gives the VCP an 
otherwise challenged political legitimacy to 
maintain its rule over the country.
Therefore, the top priority for Vietnam as 
well as the VCP leadership now is to maintain 
a peaceful and stable regional environment 
conducive to the nation’s domestic 
socioeconomic development. Vietnam’s 
strategic policy is being formulated along this 
principal guideline.
Vietnam’s rise out of the ashes of war 
and underdevelopment has been widely 
acknowledged as a significant contribution 
to regional peace, security and prosperity. 
Its further economic transformation and 
international integration should therefore 
be encouraged and supported by the 
international community, especially countries 
in the Asia–Pacific region:
• First, Vietnam’s continued success will 
lay the groundwork for it to contribute 
to regional peace and security. Its 
constructive participation in international 
and regional institutions and its plan to 
join peacekeeping operations within the 
UN framework are two cases in point.
• Second, with the rise of China as a 
potential challenger to regional order 
and stability, an independent, open 
and stronger Vietnam will be a more 
favourable option for regional strategists 
than a weak, inward‑looking and 
China‑dependent Vietnam.
• Finally, the economic growth and 
international integration of Vietnam will 
both contribute to regional prosperity and 
encourage the transformation of Vietnam 
into a more open and democratic society 
in the long term. In this connection, 
although Vietnam’s human rights record 
is still being criticised by some countries, it 
would be unwise to let the issue alienate 
Vietnam and discourage the country from 
further international integration. After 
all, through international integration and 
socialisation, Vietnam may well adapt 
itself and adopt universal values, norms 
and standards along the way.
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Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr (L) and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang (R) shake hands the at Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, 
28 March 2012. Carr is on an official visit to Vietnam. © EPA/LUONG THAI LINH via Corbis.
As a middle power seeking to enhance 
its role in the Asia–Pacific, Australia 
could find Vietnam a valuable partner. 
Vietnam’s strategic trajectory also has 
important implications for Australia. As a 
middle power seeking to enhance its role in 
the Asia–Pacific, Australia could find Vietnam 
a valuable partner. Vietnam considers 
Australia’s greater international role and its 
participation in regional institutions to be 
beneficial for regional peace and stability. 
For example, Vietnam’s support contributed 
significantly to Australia’s successful bid for 
membership in the East Asia Summit. As a key 
player in ASEAN, Vietnam can also provide 
Australia with a useful source of support 
and a channel for information and policy 
coordination within ASEAN‑led arrangements. 
And, given China’s rise and Vietnam’s 
strategic location, Australia should take 
Vietnam into consideration for future regional 
security configurations.
In the same vein, Vietnam highly values the 
relationship with Australia as a key pillar in its 
strategic and foreign policy. As noted in this 
paper, it’s attached great importance to the 
development of its relations with regional 
middle powers, especially against the 
backdrop of China’s rise and increasing 
tensions in the South China Sea. Australia’s 
interests apparently converge with Vietnam’s, 
judging by Canberra’s recent agreement to 
rotate 2,500 US marines through Darwin. 
Some Australian analysts point out that the 
move is to reassure Australians that the 
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ANZUS Treaty is still relevant and has life into 
the 21st century. However, in the eyes of many 
Vietnamese strategists, that move also 
indicates that Australia might be able to play 
a significant role in constraining China’s 
ambitions in the region.
In 2010, bilateral trade between the 
two countries reached US$4.1 billion, 
and Australia is now Vietnam’s fifth 
largest export market. 
Stronger ties with Australia would bring 
Vietnam not only strategic benefits. In 2010, 
bilateral trade between the two countries 
reached US$4.1 billion, and Australia is 
now Vietnam’s fifth largest export market. 
Australia is also a major aid donor to Vietnam, 
providing the country with $137.9 million 
in official development assistance during 
the 2011–12 financial year.22
Despite recent achievements, there are still 
many things the two countries can do to 
further strengthen their comprehensive 
partnership for mutual benefit:
• In the political field, close policy 
consultations between the two countries 
should continue. They should also provide 
support for each other’s efforts in 
international institutions, including bids 
for membership in UN bodies.
• In the security field, they should deepen 
their defence and security cooperation 
through such measures as intensifying 
strategic study and intelligence exchange, 
promoting humanitarian aid and disaster 
relief, and exchanging experience in 
peacekeeping and maritime security.
• On the economic front, there’s still 
enormous room for the two countries 
to increase their bilateral trade. The TPP 
negotiations, which are expected to be 
concluded this year, may give Vietnam 
and Australia a valuable opportunity to 
further step up their economic ties and 
consolidate the economic foundation of 
their relationship.23
Conclusion
Vietnam’s successful economic 
transformation under the Doi Moi policy 
has helped redefine the way the country is 
perceived worldwide. Vietnam used to be an 
adjective for a war, but now it’s better known 
as a dynamic economy, a peaceful country 
and an increasingly important player in 
regional politics.
Positive socioeconomic development since 
the late 1980s has undoubtedly been the 
most important source of the VCP’s political 
legitimacy and thus a major factor in 
maintaining its hold on power. Sustaining 
development to buttress the party’s rule 
remains the top priority of the Vietnamese 
leadership, so the country’s strategic policy is 
directed at maintaining a peaceful and stable 
international environment conducive to its 
domestic development. Vietnam’s strategic 
policy also aims to defend its national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially 
in the South China Sea, and to promote the 
country’s international prestige.
One of Vietnam’s toughest foreign relations 
challenges is to maintain a balance between 
China and the US. Both are important 
to Vietnam, albeit in different ways, and 
Vietnam can’t sacrifice the relationship with 
one at the expense of the other. However, 
Vietnam may find walking the line between 
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the two great powers increasingly difficult, 
given the dubious consequences of China’s 
rise and its growing assertiveness in the 
South China Sea. Therefore, while Vietnam 
strives to maintain a peaceful and stable 
relationship with China, it also seeks to 
forge closer ties with the US, not only for 
economic benefits but also as a measure 
to deter Chinese aggression. Nevertheless, 
in most cases, Vietnam isn’t eager to push 
the relationship with the US so far that its 
relationship with China turns hostile. The only 
situation in which Vietnam might temporarily 
lean towards the US is when China forcefully 
asserts its claims in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea dispute continues to 
present Vietnam with its greatest security 
challenge. Although it can’t afford a hostile 
relationship with Beijing, it won’t surrender 
its territorial integrity for a submissive peace. 
Therefore, Vietnam has been stressing the 
policy of self‑reliance and investing in the 
modernisation of its military to develop a 
deterrent capability against China in the 
South China Sea. However, facing a far more 
powerful neighbour, it’s also been resorting 
to other measures, including soft‑balancing 
against China through international 
institutions and strengthening its relations 
with foreign partners. Although Vietnam 
places emphasis on developing its ties with 
the US, a stronger relationship with the 
superpower is likely to cause unwanted 
collateral damage to Vietnam’s relations with 
China. Therefore, in addition to developing 
ties with the US to a reasonable level to deter 
growing Chinese assertiveness, Vietnam also 
pays great attention to strengthening its 
ties with other countries, especially regional 
middle powers such as Japan, India, South 
Korea and Australia.
Over the past three decades, the rise of 
Vietnam out of military conflict and economic 
underdevelopment through international 
integration has contributed significantly 
to regional peace, security and prosperity. 
The country’s economic development and 
external engagement should be supported 
and encouraged by the international 
community, including Australia.
Both Vietnam and Australia have 
various convergent interests in 
promoting their bilateral relationship, 
ranging from mutual economic 
benefits and cooperation in 
international institutions to strategic 
considerations to address regional 
security concerns.
Both Vietnam and Australia have various 
convergent interests in promoting their 
bilateral relationship, ranging from mutual 
economic benefits and cooperation in 
international institutions to strategic 
considerations to address regional security 
concerns. New initiatives and mechanisms, 
such as the Australia–Vietnam Joint Foreign 
Affairs Defence Strategic Dialogue, which was 
held for the first time in February 2012, should 
be worked out and promoted as vehicles 
to move the bilateral strategic relationship 
forward in the long‑term interests of 
both countries.
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